Abstract: This study focuses on a major global issue: the rise of sovereign wealth funds (SWFs). Using the largest data set of their holdings to date, we document a large SWF premium of more than 15% of firm value. 
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Lack of confidence in financial markets following the 2008 crash has driven investors and funds away from corporations. As corporate balance sheets deteriorate, firms are in need of more and more capital -which investors are not willing to provide. In this setting, Sovereign Wealth Funds (SWFs) have emerged as the funding source of the next years. According to the Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute, SWFs manage more than US$3 trillion, a number that can be put into perspective by considering that the hedge fund and private equity markets combined account for less than US$2 trillion. Some estimates suggest that SWFs will manage more than US$10 trillion by 2015. (Financial Times Special Report (2008); Lyons (2007) ).
Given their increasing size, SWFs have recently been widely discussed.
However, much of the commentary on them is based on anecdotal evidence.
Large-sample evidence about SWFs is lacking. As a result, even the most basic questions about SWF investments remain unanswered.
In this paper, we study the changing pattern of world capital markets and analyze the role of SWFs. We examine what drives SWFs to invest in firms and what role these investors play. We are interested in whether SWFs can influence management and boards toward creating shareholder value.
To answer these questions, we construct the most extensive and thoroughly documented set of observations of SWF investments to date, extending from the beginning of 2002 through the end of 2007. Across this timeframe, the data set contains more than 21,000 SWF holdings, in close to 8,000 firms in 58 countries.
We first document the "Sovereign Wealth Fund premium." Controlling for a variety of firm and country characteristics, across different samples and specifications, we find a significant premium -between 15% and 20% of firm value -associated with SWF investment in a firm. Furthermore, the impact of SWFs goes beyond that of the typical institutional investor: The market pays on average a much higher premium for firms where SWFs have a stake than for firms owned by general institutional investors. This evidence is not consistent with the idea that SWFs extract private benefits of control or that they may be investing with hidden political agendas or to expropriate minority shareholders.
We also assess whether SWF ownership has an impact on operational measures of performance. We find a positive association of SWF investments with ROA (Return on Assets), ROE (Return on Equity) and net profit margin. The positive impact documented on firm's value is fully consistent with the evidence of improved performance of firms where SWFs invest.
In addition to the value creation role of SWFs, we also study the selection process of SWFs by investigating the determinants of their holdings. SWFs invest in virtually all countries in the developed world and a few emerging market economies. As market players, they are certainly a driving force, holding positions in virtually one out of every five firms worldwide. Although SWFs can acquire much larger holdings than other institutions (they are not required by law to maintain diversified portfolios), they do not typically seek control of target companies. The distribution of their holdings is highly skewed. On average, an SWF takes 0.74% of the shares outstanding in a firm. In dollar terms, the average position is US$46.3 million.
In terms of determinants of their holdings, first we find that all SWF investors prefer the stock of large and profitable firms. Second, they have a strong bias for firms that have external visibility. They tend to choose stocks with high analyst coverage. Third, SWFs tend to hold stocks in countries that have strong governance standards and good-quality institutions. Finally, their holdings are not related to the amount of research and development (R&D) activity at the firm level, which contradicts the political argument that one of their motives might be to import innovation to their home countries through the "backdoor." Additional evidence suggests that SWF investments may have a stabilizing effect on financial markets.
They tend to be long-term investors, and they are willing to buy more when prices are falling. They are also not particularly concerned with stock liquidity, which is a characteristic typically valued by short-term investors.
We contribute to the literature on corporate governance around the world by adding to the debate on what kind of monitoring by institutional investors is effective. Shleifer and Vishny (1986) present a theory of the relationship between shareholder size and corporate governance. Several papers have found evidence consistent with a monitoring role for large shareholders (Franks and Mayer (2001) , Gillian and Starks (2007) , Hartzell and Starks (2003) , Chen et al. (2007), Ferreira and Matos (2008) , among others). Burkart et al. (1997) developed a model that considers the trade-off between the benefits of concentrated ownership (monitoring) and the associated costs (threat of expropriation). There is also evidence that concentrated ownership may be associated with the extraction of private benefits of control and, therefore, should be value decreasing (Dyck and Zingales (2004) ; Doidge et al. (2008a) ).
In principle, SWFs invest in equities with the purpose of maximizing the return on their country's reserves. By taking sizeable (and long term) stakes in corporations, they can perform a corporate governance role that other shareholders should welcome. On the other hand, because they are powerful investors, there is no reason why we should not expect SWFs to expropriate minority shareholders and pursue interests other than maximum portfolio performance.
Our findings have important implications for the policy debate about SWF investment and regulation. Our results suggest that SWFs are not short-term holders and appear to generate substantial value for firm shareholders. They also have a stabilizing effect on financial markets and are important liquidity providers in bad periods. The controversy around SWFs is more political than financial because typically SWF ownership is positively valued by the market, with a premium amounting to 15% to 20% of firm value. This suggests that contrary to arguments that SWFs expropriate minority investors and pursue ill-intentioned political agendas, they in fact contribute to long-term shareholder value creation and bring about larger value increases than other institutional investors. These observations, and other evidence presented in this paper, challenge the premises of proposals to increase SWF regulation.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section I provides an introduction to SWFs and the controversial arguments that surround them. Section II describes the sample. Section III looks at how SWFs invest. Section IV analyzes the firm performance and valuation implications of SWF investments. Section V concludes and discusses some implications of our work.
I. The Sovereign Wealth Fund Controversy
Although definitions vary, SWFs are essentially state-owned investment funds that invest in international financial markets. Unfortunately, there is a lot we do not know about sovereign funds, because only a few of them publish information about their assets or investment strategies.
SWFs have existed at least since the 1950s-the Kuwait Investment Office was set up in 1953-but their total size worldwide has increased substantially over the past 10-15 years. Oil producing nations set up the first wave of SWFs after the price increases in the 1970s and 1980s. Because oil is a nonrenewable resource, the underlying idea was that governments wanted to spread the benefits of this endowment across generations by investing part of today's income in financial assets. The crisis in East Asia in the late 1990s resulted in a second wave of SWFs being set up. After the crisis, most emerging markets in the region shifted from being debtors to being creditors. Many of these countries now prudently hold more reserves than needed. As in many other markets, China's strong manufacturing growth has not been matched by higher domestic spending and investment. Savings have thus begun to accumulate in a SWF. This led to the recent creation (in September 2007) of the China Investment Corporation, the large Chinese SWF with more than US$200 billion in assets under management.
Most of the savings in SWFs have accumulated in the form of foreign currency reserves with the traditional investment vehicles being debt instruments such as government bonds from industrialized nations. The low returns on these investments, however, have prompted nations with excess foreign reserves to invest in equities to achieve higher returns. These expanded activities over the past several years, together with the increased amounts available, have created concern that SWFs can destabilize financial markets and the global economy if their investments are motivated by political rather than economic considerations.
The first SWF, the Kuwait Investment Office, ran into trouble in Britain in 1987 when it acquired a stake of more than 20% in British Petroleum (recently privatized). The UK government, headed by Margaret Thatcher at the time, did not like the idea of a national treasure being owned by a foreign government. In the end, the Kuwaitis had to sell more than half their stake.
The recent emergence and size of SWFs such as the China Investment Corporation (CIC) has provoked intense political debate in Western countries (Summers (2007) ). The main concern centers on CIC's objectives and how far its investments will be driven only by financial returns. Other concerns include: low transparency, obscure motives underlying the purchase of strategic assets, possible breach of national security as a result of this "pseudo-government" ownership, and the influence SWFs may obtain in the management of the firms in which they hold shares. In 2005, the Chinese oil company, CNOOC, tried to acquire the US oil company, Unacol. The deal was blocked in Washington on grounds of "national security and strategic interests." In 2006, DP World, a port operator owned by the government of Dubai, sought to take over P&O's business in America, which included terminals in New York and New Jersey. This provoked intense debate in the US on the need to review foreign investments in strategically important sectors and sensitive infrastructure, such as the oil industry and marine cargo facilities. Several other Western countries have raised concerns about SWFs. The German government, for example, has announced that it would introduce controls on investments by SWFs, especially if they seek stakes in Although most SWFs have so far declined a seat on the management boards of their investments, there is suspicion that they may exert influence behind the scenes. Critics argue that SWFs do not need to appoint directors to a board in order to have influence when they own 10% of a company. Particularly relevant is the case of Saudi Arabia's Prince Al-Walid bin Talal, who does not have a seat on Citigroup's board. He has, however, been considered influential in the decisionmaking process, including the recent ouster of chief executive Charles O. Prince III (Dash, 2007) .
II. Data Description
The initial sample includes all firms in the Datastream/WorldScope (DS/WS) database for the years 2002 through 2007. Using Worldscope and Datastream, we construct measures of firm size (logarithm of firm total assets), financial leverage (total debt divided by total assets), Return on Equity (ROE), Return on Assets (ROA), dividend yield, the ratio of cash to total assets, the ratio of R&D to total assets, stock returns, turnover, and firm growth opportunities (sales growth).
In addition to the variables that are related to the business model and financial performance of the firm, we also use a number of variables that are related to external visibility. We use the percentage of foreign sales (FX sales) as a proxy for the product market recognition abroad and the number of analysts (Analysts) following a firm in a certain year (Institutional Brokers' Estimate System or IBES) as a proxy for the level of information available to investors. MSCI is a dummy variable that equals one if the firm is a member of the MSCI All Country World index, and zero otherwise. We also include information on cross-listings. We used several data sources to determine which non-US firms are cross-listed in the US and when they entered and exited the listing.
1 ADR (American Depository Receipt) is a dummy that equals one if a company is cross-listed in a US exchange in that year.
1 Data on non-US firms listing in the US market are obtained from the major depository institutions: Citibank, Bank of New York, JP Morgan, stock exchanges, SEC, and news searches, following Fernandes and Ferreira (2008) .
We also use several country-level variables that have been shown to be related to international investment choices of big institutions (e.g. Ferreira and
Matos (2008) The valuation measure we use is Tobin's Q, which we compute as follows.
For the numerator, we start with the book value of total assets, subtract the book value of equity and add the market value of equity). For the denominator, we use the book value of total assets. In addition, we construct a global industry Q, which equals for each year, the median Q in the industry to which the firm belongs (based on 2-digit SIC codes).
We winsorize financial ratios such as Tobin's Q, return on equity and leverage at the bottom and top 1% levels.
A. A New Database on SWFs
There is no central database of SWF holdings. We, therefore, construct a novel data set of their international holdings since 2002.
Our data collection follows a three-step procedure. As a first step, we use the Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute (SWF Institute) list of SWFs and concentrate on the top 20 funds. These funds represent 97% of the SWF universe. Table I shows the main SWFs around the world and their size (in absolute terms and relative to the country population). These data are from the Sovereign Wealth Fund
Institute and the World Bank World Development Indicators.
<INSERT Although our sample might not be representative of all potential SWF investments around the world, we believe it includes all the important events because any events we have missed have also failed to catch the attention of the media (and regulators) and, therefore, are unlikely to be economically meaningful.
B. SWF Investment in Companies
We begin by characterizing the main stylized facts. The median (mean) percentage stake that an SWF takes in a firm is 0.25% (0.74%), and the median (mean) value of the position is US$3.1 (US$46.3) million.
We note that most investments require large capital commitments, but they are small in terms of ownership stake. For example, the 75th percentile of the market value of holdings is US$13 million. In 2007, SWFs held more than 480 positions with a market value above US$100 million.
An important pattern emerging from Figure 1 is that SWF investments do not generally involve holding controlling blocks of stock. The interquartile of SWF stakes is from 0.1% to 0.34%. Even at the 95th percentile of the sample, SWFs hold less than 1.5% of companies' shares, considerably lower than the majority requirement. It, therefore, appears that SWFs are generally not interested in taking control of a company in which they invest. In less than 0.5% of their investments is the percentage of control higher than 50%. Table II documents the top 35 holdings of the SWFs in our sample.
<INSERT TABLE II ABOUT HERE>
In our empirical analysis, we define total SWF ownership (SWF_TOTAL) as the sum of the holdings of all SWFs of a firm's stock divided by market capitalization at the end of each calendar year. We sum SWF positions in local and ADR shares (if the firm held is cross-listed in the US). We define a dummy variable for large equity investments by SWFs (SWF Dummy) that equals one if the ownership stake held by SWFs in the company is greater than 1%; and zero otherwise.
III. Which Companies do SWFs Choose?
What kind of characteristics do SWFs look for when choosing their investments?
We explore the determinants of the choices by SWFs of different stocks worldwide.
First, we examine the role of different firm characteristics related to the business model. We then examine the role of visibility, capital market conditions, and also country-level development and quality of institutions.
A. Univariate Comparison with Control Group
Table III provides details about the firms held, and illustrates the considerable heterogeneity in the selection of companies. We also provide statistics on the control sample, which is the universe of DS/WS firms that are not held by SWFs at the end of each year.
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The average firm held by SWFs has total assets of US$229 million, annual sales growth of 15%, and a leverage ratio of 24%. In terms of visibility indicators, the average firm is tracked by 13 analysts and 32% of its sales are international.
In discussing the statistics, we say that the difference between the firm held by SWFs and its control group (firms not held) is significant if both the t-statistic (for the mean) and the rank sum test (for the median) indicate a two-tail significance of at least 5%.
<INSERT TABLE III ABOUT HERE>
Firms held by SWFs are significantly larger and more liquid. In terms of operational performance, firms held by SWFs tend to have higher ROE and dividend yield. The cash-to-asset ratio is lower than that of the peers. Firms held by
SWFs also tend to be members of the MSCI index, have significantly higher institutional ownership, foreign sales and analyst coverage. Table IV 
<INSERT TABLE IV ABOUT HERE>

B. Regression Analysis
We investigate the determinants of SWF stock ownership decisions worldwide. We start by examining which firm-level characteristics drive their selections. We are also interested in assessing the relative contribution of firm-and country-level factors in explaining SWF holdings of different stocks around the world. We ask whether stock selection is determined mainly by the firm's characteristics, business model and operating environment, or, alternatively, by country characteristics, such as its level of development and the quality of its legal institutions. 4 We define a dummy variable for large equity investments by SWFs (SWF Dummy) that equals one if the ownership stake held by SWFs in the company is greater than 1%; and zero otherwise.
While Table III compares firms held by SWFs with their peers along single dimensions, Table V reports results from probit multivariate regressions of the SWF dummy to assess the marginal effect of each covariate. The SWF Dummy equals one if the ownership stake held by SWFs in the company is greater than 1%; and zero otherwise. We explore the effects of country and firm characteristics on the probability of being chosen by an SWF using probit regressions. The probit is estimated using data from 2007. In all specifications, we cluster standard errors at the country level.
<INSERT TABLE V ABOUT HERE>
Size is the log of total assets in US dollars; Leverage is the ratio of total debt to total assets; INVOP is a proxy for investment opportunities, computed as the two-year geometric sales growth; ROE is the return on equity; DY is the dividend yield; R&D is the ratio of R&D spending to total assets; CAPEX is the ratio of capital expenditures to total assets; Cash is the ratio of cash holdings to total assets; ADR is a dummy equal to one if the stock is cross-listed in the US exchanges, zero otherwise; FX sales is the percentage of foreign sales; Analysts is the number of financial analysts following the firm; MSCI is a dummy variable equal to one if the firm is included in the MSCI index, zero otherwise; Return is the return in the past year; Turnover is the trading volume divided by shares outstanding; ANTISELF is the anti-self-dealing index constructed by Djankov et al. (2008) . This index measures the ex-ante and ex-post effectiveness of regulation and enforcement against violators, and refers to 2003. GDP is the GDP per capita from the World Bank, used as a proxy for economic development; MCAP/GDP is the ratio of country market capitalization to GDP, a proxy for financial development computed using World Bank and Datastream data; Turnover_ct is the ratio of country value traded to GDP, a proxy for liquidity of financial markets computed using World Bank and Datastream data.
The results in column (1) of Table V show that there is a strong demand by
SWFs for large stocks (SIZE). This is consistent with findings in Gompers and
Metrick (2001) and Ferreira and Matos (2008) . The regression also shows that
SWFs have a tendency to invest in companies with proven profitability (ROE). This is consistent with the "prudent man" rules that money managers are likely to follow (Del Guercio (1996) ). They also reveal a preference for firms with lower leverage ratios.
One political argument traditionally raised is the fear that SWFs invest in
Western corporations as a means of corporate intelligence. Our results do not support this interpretation. As indicated in column (1) of Table V , SWFs do not have any particular preference for high-tech firms (as proxied by the ratio of R&D to assets) among the universe of public firms.
Firm visibility can play a role in the choices made by SWFs, as suggested by market segmentation theories (Merton (1987) ). We investigate the role of company visibility characteristics in column (2). We study the role of US crosslistings, MSCI index membership, analyst coverage and foreign sales as determinants of SWF investments. Overall, we find that SWFs show a strong demand for stocks with high analyst coverage. They do not, however, reveal any strong demand for firms that belong to MSCI indices. The index membership result is interesting, as SWFs, contrary to regular mutual funds, have no business concerns in terms of performance and flows. The money that flows into the fund is independent of its performance (or any benchmarking) and relies heavily on the health of the domestic economies of each of their countries.
In column (3), we add variables related to capital markets. We do not find that SWFs have a strong preference for liquid stocks, as the coefficient on turnover is not significant. This is consistent with the evidence that SWFs tend to be longterm investors for which liquidity is not a main concern. The negative coefficient on past yearly return of the stock suggests that SWFs are willing to step in when asset prices fall. This likely exerts a stabilizing influence on the financial system. They are not momentum investors.
In column (4), we combine firm-and country-level determinants of SWF holdings. Firms in countries with weak anti-self-dealing regulations have, on average, lower SWF holdings. In other words, SWFs are more prone to investing in countries where the legal regime guarantees a minimum of protection to their investment. The coefficients on GDP, market development and country liquidity are not significant. We interpret this to indicate that economic and financial development is not the main driver of selections made by SWFs and that the quality of institutions is a much better determinant.
To maximize the potential explanatory power of country characteristics, in columns (5)- (7) we include country fixed effects. This estimation accounts for all unobserved sources of SWF selection procedures that are related to the country's environment. All previous results remain unchanged: SWFs prefer large, profitable firms with high analyst coverage. They do not chase momentum stocks, nor do they prefer highly liquid or high-tech firms. SWFs also do not have a preference for cross-listed stocks. In addition, they tend to invest more in companies with higher capital expenditure ratios and lower leverage.
Interestingly, the R2 increases from 15% (in column (3)) to 18% (in column (7)) when we add country fixed effects. We interpret the low increase in R2
as evidence that firm-specific factors are a very important driver of the global variation of SWF holdings, much stronger than country-level factors.
IV. The Sovereign Wealth Fund Premium
To investigate the relation between SWF ownership and firm value, we use Tobin's Q as a measure of firm value, calculated as the book value of total assets plus the market value of equity minus the book value of equity divided by total assets (see Gompers et al. (2003) and Doidge et al. (2004) . As an alternative, we also use the percentage of ownership by SWFs for all firms in the database.
We restrict the sample to firms with a market capitalization above US$10 million. 6 Cross-sectional dependence across firms in a given year is a concern associated with Tobin's Q regressions. Another concern is that errors are correlated across time for a given firm (time-series dependence). We address 5 Given that for some large firms 1% is a substantial commitment, we test the robustness of our results to alternative definitions of this dummy, namely also including companies where the size of SWF positions are larger than US$10 million or US$100 million. In Table VII we show how the results are unchanged using these alternative measures. 6 In Table VII we show that the results are not affected by this procedure.
these issues by using standard errors adjusted for clustering at the firm-level and year dummies in our panel regressions (Petersen (2008)). If we include country characteristics, namely the anti-self-dealing index, the GDP and proxies for financial development and market liquidity, a similar picture emerges (Column (4)).
Columns (5)- (8) all firms in our sample, without any restriction on firm size. As before, there is a positive and significant SWF premium. A possible additional concern with our results is within-country correlation. To account for possible country-level correlation of the residuals, we estimate in column (2) the model with country clustered standard errors, in addition to country and year fixed effects. The results remain unchanged. To obtain a more homogenous sample of firms across countries, columns (3) to (6) restrict the sample to firms with assets or market capitalization above a certain threshold. Columns (3) and (4) consider only firms with total assets above US$10 million and US$100 million respectively. Columns (5) and (6) restrict the sample to firms with a market capitalization above US$10 million and US$100 million. Column (7) presents results of the estimation using only US firms, while column (8) considers only non-US firms. The basic results are unaffected by these sample variations.
<INSERT TABLE VII ABOUT HERE>
So far, all the results have been based on our full sample period. Although we control for country and year fixed effects, and cluster standard errors at the firm level, there is still a possible concern with time-series dependence of the residuals.
Column (9) reports the regression coefficients using only 2007 holdings and firms.
As before, we find a positive and significant relation between Tobin's Q and SWF ownership. Finally, column (10) tries to address the potential endogeneity of SWF ownership and firm valuation. We provide evidence of an independent effect of SWFs on the firm valuation by applying a two-stage least-squares (2SLS) procedure. Identification is achieved by the independent variables included in the SWF selection equation that are not related to Tobin's Q, particularly stock returns, MSCI membership, dividend yield, and number of analysts (we use the most complete estimate of the probit model in Table V) . Overall, the results using 2SLS corroborate the findings with respect to the positive impact on firm value of SWF investors.
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Our results so far are based on the dummy variable (SWF DUMMY) that equals one if SWFs hold more than 1% of the firms' outstanding shares. We obtain similar results (unreported) using alternative definitions. We define a large SWF holding if the sum of shares held is higher than 1% or the market value of the holdings by SWFs is larger than US$10 million or US$100 million. The results remain unchanged.
Finally, in Table VIII Tobin's Q. The remaining control variables remain with the expected signs.
A. The Impact on Operational Performance
The large premium documented is consistent with the view that SWF ownership is positively valued by the market and that SWFs are related to larger value increases than other institutional investors. It is possible that SWFs simply identify undervalued companies but do not add to firms' fundamental value. If the increase in Q is a result of superior stock-picking capability, then we should observe no impact on firms' operating performance. If indeed SWF ownership is related with value creation at the firm level, we should see a positive impact also on non-stock market measures of profitability.
To distinguish between these two hypotheses, we now present evidence of the impact of SWF on different measures of firms' operating performance. We use return on assets (ROA), return on equity (ROE) and operating profit margins (defined as EBITDA/sales and EBITDA/assets) as measures of operating profitability. Figure 3 presents the results. We report the different performance metrics, before and after having SWF as a major shareholder. The results show that after an SWF acquires a stake larger than 1% in a company, overall, operational performance improves. Using different periods before and after SWF investments, ROA, ROE and operating profit margin, are higher after their entry. Unreported regression results indicate that the magnitudes of the coefficients are statistically significant for all metrics.
To summarize, we find that SWF investment is not only associated with higher firm value, but also with improved operating performance at the firm level.
Importantly, this improvement in value and performance is consistent with eventstudy evidence on the market reaction to SWF announcements (Chhaochharia and 
V. Conclusion
Although SWFs have recently been widely discussed, much of the commentary on them is based on anecdotal evidence. Regulators question whether SWF investments benefit shareholders, while numerous critics claim that SWF investments are done with political motives in mind.
This paper is the first attempt to study SWF equity holdings using a largescale sample from 2002 through 2007. Our novel data set covers over 21,426 SWF investments across 58 countries during this period and involves 7,708 unique companies.
Our analysis provides important new evidence on the mechanisms and effects of SWF investments worldwide. We examine the determinants and firm valuation effects of SWF ownership, using a large sample of their investments in firms in both developed and emerging markets.
The controversy around SWFs is more political than financial because SWF ownership is typically positively valued by the market. We document a significant premium on firm value for SWF investments (15% to 20%) as well as significant improvements in operating performance. This suggests that contrary to arguments that SWFs expropriate investors and pursue ill-intentioned political agendas, they in fact contribute to creating long-term shareholder value. Overall, SWFs seem to have a positive effect on their investments. We also find that they have the potential to play a stabilizing role on capital markets by being the "buyer-of-last-resort" when markets are falling. This table presents descriptive statistics of firm-and country-level variables, for all firms, as well as for firms held and not held by SWFs. ANTISELF is the anti-self-dealing index for the country from Djankov et al. 2008 ; GDP is the GDP per capita from the World Bank, used as a proxy for economic development; MCAP/GDP is the ratio of country market capitalization to GDP, a proxy for financial development computed using World Bank and Datastream data; TURNOVER_ct is the ratio of country value traded to GDP, a proxy for liquidity of financial markets, computed using World Bank and Datastream data. Q is Tobin's Q computed as book value of total assets plus the market value of equity minus the book value of equity divided by total assets; INDUSTRY Q is the median of the individual firm's Tobin Q in a certain industry-year (based on 2-digit SIC); Size is the log of total assets in US dollars; Leverage is the ratio of total debt to total assets; INVOP is investment opportunities, computed as the two year geometric sales growth; ROE is the return on equity; DY is the dividend yield; R&D is the ratio of R&D spending to total assets; CAPEX is the ratio of capital expenditures to total assets; Cash is the ratio of cash holdings to total assets; ADR is a dummy equal to one if the stock is cross-listed in the US exchanges, zero otherwise; FX sales is the percentage of foreign sales; Analysts is the number of financial analysts following the firm; MSCI is a dummy variable equal to one if the firm is included in the MSCI index, zero otherwise; Return is the return in the past year; TURNOVER is the trading volume divided by shares outstanding; IO percentage is the percentage of ownership by institutional investors; IO Dummy is a dummy that equals one if institutional investors hold more than 1% of firms' shares; SWF percentage is the percentage of ownership by SWFs; SWF Dummy is a dummy that equals one if SWFs hold more than 1% of firms' shares, zero otherwise. The sample period is from 2002 to 2007. All ratios are winsorized at the 1% and 99% level. T-Test is the t-statistic for the difference in means (firms held -firms not held), and rank sum test tests differences in the median. ** and * denote that a coefficient is significant at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively. The dependent variable is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the ownership stake of SWFs in the company is greater than 1%; and zero otherwise. All the other variables are defined in Table II . The data is from 2007. We present coefficient estimates from a probit regression. Robust standard errors corrected for heteroskedasticity and clustered at the country level are presented in parentheses. ** and * denote that a coefficient is significant at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively. Column (1) includes only firm-level determinants. Column (2) includes both country-and firm-level determinants. Column (3) reports estimates using country fixed effects. Column (4) uses only US firms. Table II . All specifications use standard errors corrected for heteroskedasticity and clustered at the firm level. Absolute values of t-statistics are presented below the coefficients. ** and * denote that a coefficient is significant at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively. Columns (1)-(4) include year fixed effects. Columns (5)- (8) include country and year fixed effects. We restrict the sample to firms with a market capitalization above US$10 million.
(1) (3) and (4) include only firms with total assets above US$10 million and 100 million, respectively. Columns (5) and (6) restrict the sample to firms with a market capitalization above US$10 million and US$100 million. Column (7) presents results of the estimation using only US firms. Column (8) presents results of the estimation using only non-US firms. Column (9) reports the regression coefficients using only 2007 holdings and firms. Column (10) uses a two-stage least-squares (2SLS) procedure. The independent variables included in the SWF selection equation are: stock returns, MSCI dummy, dividend yield, and number of analysts. All the other variables are defined in Table 2 . All specifications (except for column (2), where country-clustered standard errors are used) use standard errors corrected for heteroskedasticity and clustered at the firm level. Absolute values of t-statistics are presented below the coefficients. ** and * denote that a coefficient is significant at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively. All regressions include country and year fixed effects.
(1)
(8) Table II . All specifications use standard errors corrected for heteroskedasticity and clustered at the firm level. Absolute values of t-statistics are presented below the coefficients. ** and * denote that a coefficient is significant at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively. Columns (1)-(4) include year fixed effects. Columns (5)- (8) include country and year fixed effects. We restrict the sample to firms with a market capitalization above US$10 million.
(1) 6.6%
11.2%
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